Hegel: practical philosophy
(moral, political, legal philosophy) Abstracts of Articles by K. R. WESTPHAL

‘From “Convention” to “Ethical Life”: Hume’s Theory of Justice in Post-Kantian Perspective’. The Journal of Moral Philosophy 7.1 (2010):1–28. Hume and contemporary Humeans contend that moral sentiments form the sole and sufficient basis of moral judgments. This thesis is criticised by appeal to Hume’s theory of justice, which shows that basic principles of justice are required to form and to maintain society, which is indispensable to human life, and that acting according to, or violating, these principles is right, or wrong, regardless of anyone’s sentiments, motives or character. Furthermore, Hume’s theory of justice shows how the principles of justice are artificial without being arbitrary. In this regard, Hume’s theory belongs to the unjustly neglected modern natural law tradition. Some key merits of this strand in Hume’s theory are explicated by linking it to Kant’s constructivist method of identifying and justifying practical principles (à la O’Neill), and by showing how and why Hegel adopted and further developed Kant’s constructivism by re-integrating it with Hume’s central natural law concern with our actual social practices. ‘Hegel’. In: J. Skorupski, ed., The Routledge Companion to Ethics (London, Routledge), ca. 2009. A 5,000-word conspectus of Hegel’s moral philosophy. ‘Normative Constructivism: Hegel’s Radical Social Philosophy’. SATS – Nordic Journal of Philosophy 8.2 (2007):7–41. Onora O’Neill has contributed enormously to moral philosophy (broadly speaking, including both ethics and political philosophy) by identifying Kant’s unique and powerful form of normative constructivism. Frederick Neuhouser has contributed similarly by showing that all of Hegel’s standards of moral rationality aim to insure the complete development of three distinct, complementary forms of personal, moral and social freedom. However, Neuhouser’s study does not examine Hegel’s justificatory methods and principles. The present article aims to reinforce and extend Neuhouser’s findings by explicating Hegel’s basic principles for justifying practical norms. Surprisingly, Hegel’s basic principles of normative justification are rooted in Kant’s constructivism, as explicated by O’Neill. Hegel’s adaptation and development of Kant’s constructivism results in a powerful form of constructivism about moral principles which merits contemporary interest because it is more powerful and more objectivist than familiar contemporary forms of constructivism. ‘Kant, Hegel, and Determining Our Duties’. In: S. Byrd & J. Joerden eds., Philosophia practica universalis. Festschrift für Joachim Hruschka. Jahrbuch für Recht & Ethik/Annual Review of Law & Ethics 13 (2005):335–354. Hegel identified in Kant’s practical philosophy precisely the powerful kind of constructivism about the identification and justification of norms that has recently been explicated by Onora O’Neill. If so (I have argued elsewhere this is so), what then did Hegel contribute to practical 1

philosophy? This essay partly answers this question by examining Kant’s and Hegel’s views of the aim and structure of practical philosophy, and what is required to determine specific duties. This theme is specified by examining these issues: two oversights in Kant’s justification of rights to possession (§2), the role of philosophical anthropology in Kant’s universalization tests (§3), the roles of social institutions in specifying our ethical obligations (§4), Kant’s under-developed view of government (§5), and Hegel’s claim that, in contrast to Kant’s Rechtslehre, his Rechtsphilosophie provides an „immanent“ doctrine of duties (§6). I argue that Hegel attempted to respond to his own criticisms of Kant’s Categorical Imperative, and in doing so, Hegel contributed to practical philosophy in ways that Kantians and other moral, social and legal philosophers should consider seriously. „Von der Konvention zur Sittlichkeit. Humes Begründung einer Rechtsethik aus nach-Kantischer Perspektive“. In: D. Heidemann & K. Engelhardt, eds., Ethikbegründungen Zwischen Universalismus und Relativismus (Berlin: DeGruyter, 2005), 153–180. Die Moralphilosophie Humes gehört zu der von J. B. Schneewind identifizierten Überlieferung der moralischen Autonomie, zufolge, daß unsere praktischen Grundnormen weder vom Gott noch der Natur sondern von der Natur und Tätigkeiten des Menschen entstammen. Es ist schon bekannt worden, daß sich Hegel viel mit der „schottischen Schule“ der Philosophie beschäftigt hat. Diese Untersuchung arbeitet einige wichtige thematische Verhältnisse zwischen den Rechtsphilosophien Humes und Hegels heraus, um einige Stärke wie auch Schwäche der Hume’schen, wie auch einige Einsichte und Vorschritte der Hegel’schen Rechtslehren zu erfassen. Unter anderem erleuchten diese Verhältnisse einen wichtigen systematischen Sinn des Untertitels der Rechtsphilosophie Hegels, nämlich, „oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundriss.“ „Objektive Gültigkeit zwischen Gegebenem und Gemachtem. Hegels kantischer Konstruktivismus in der praktischen Philosophie“. Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik/Annual Review of Law and Ethics 11 (2003):177–98. Die gewöhnlichen Ansprüche auf Rechtsbegründung geraten in einen unbefriedigenden Konflikt zwischen Platonismus, Positivismus und Konventionalismus, darunter auch Kontraktualismus. Realismus in Bezug auf Rechtsnormen lässt sich kaum verteidigen; die starke Verschiedenheit der unterschiedlichen Ansprüche auf die angeblich ,realen’ oder ,richtigen’ Normdaten lässt sich kaum in eine eindeutige Antwort auf die Frage nach legitimen, basalen Rechtsgründen überführen. Positivismus, Konventionalismus bzw. Kontraktualismus vermeiden nur schwerlich, wenn überhaupt, den Verdacht, das Unrecht als Grundrecht anzuerkennen. Nur in Ansehung weiterer Bedingungen, die sich nicht auf Positivität, Konsens bzw. Zustimmung reduzieren lassen, liefern diese Theorievarianten eine Analyse der Rechtslegitimität. Genau diese Bedingungen – so lautet die These dieses Beitrags zum Thema philosophischer Aspekte des Rechts und der Gesetzgebung – hat zuerst Kant und auf ihn folgend Hegel geliefert. Die Tragweite dieser These zu klären erfordert ein gründliches Verständnis der Rechtsgrundlage bei Kant und Hegel. Der Ziel dieses Beitrags ist daher zugleich systematisch wie auch historisch. Systematisch besteht die Einsicht Kants und Hegels in einer besonderen Art Rechtskonstruktivismus, der zwischen der Scylla des Platonismus und der Charbydis des Konventionalismus (usw.) hindurch passt, um die Objektivität des Rechts zu begründen, ohne den Moral-Realismus in Kauf zu nehmen, aber auch der unvermeidlichen Willkürlichkeit des Konventionalismus zu entgehen.

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‘Hegel’s Standards of Political Legitimacy’. Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik/Annual Review of Law and Ethics 10 (2002):307–20. This critical review article on Frederick Neuhouser, The Foundations of Hegel’s Social Theory, examines in detail Hegel’s standards of political legitimacy, according to which social institutions are justified only by their roles in facilitating human freedom in its three basic forms: personal, moral, and social. Social freedom involves both ‘objective’ institutional requirements and ‘subjective’ aspects of personal understanding and endorsement of institutions so far as they fill their requirements. This includes rational, critical assessment of social institutions, and their role in enabling us to achieve our most basic collective good: our complex modern form of freedom. ‘Rationality and Relativism: The Historical and Contemporary Significance of Hegel’s Response to Sextus Empiricus’. Esercizi Filosofici (Trieste) 6 (2002):22–33. Modern Philosophy bloomed into the Enlightenment, a cultural and philosophical movement still alive today, despite growing criticism. Some recent critics claim (roughly) that the alleged ‘universality’ of Enlightenment reason led directly to the imposition of Eurocentric reason on other, less militarily developed cultures. Some contend that there is no such thing as ‘universal’ reason. I contend that there are serious flaws in the Enlightenment notion of reason resulting from three basic dichotomies: (1) reason versus tradition, (2) knowledge versus customary belief, and (3) individuals versus society. Identifying and remedying these flaws leads, not to the abandonment of rational enlightenment, but to an improved account of human rationality. ‘Razionalità e relativismo: Il significato storico e contemporaneo della risposta hegeliana a Sesto Empirico’. Etica e Politica 4.1 (2002), C. Ferrini, trans.
http://www.units.it/~etica/2002_1/index.html

Modern Philosophy bloomed into the Enlightenment, a cultural and philosophical movement still alive today, despite growing criticism. Some recent critics claim (roughly) that the alleged ‘universality’ of Enlightenment reason led directly to the imposition of Eurocentric reason on other, less militarily developed cultures. Some contend that there is no such thing as ‘universal’ reason. I contend that there are serious flaws in the Enlightenment notion of reason resulting from three basic dichotomies: (1) reason versus tradition, (2) knowledge versus customary belief, and (3) individuals versus society. Identifying and remedying these flaws leads, not to the abandonment of rational enlightenment, but to an improved account of human rationality. ‘The Basic Context and Structure of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right’. In: F. C. Beiser, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 234–69. Hegel’s Philosophy of Right responds to two dichotomies. One is between the freedom of rational thought in its practical application and the givenness of natural impulses and desires. Against Kant Hegel argues that pure reason alone cannot determine the content of any maxim or principle of action. Thus Hegel must find a way in which the content of natural needs and impulses – the only source of content for maxims of action – can be transfigured into contents of rationally self-given principles and maxims. Hegel also responds to the dichotomy between the individual agent and the social whole within which agents act. Hegel argues that this dichotomy is specious because human beings are fundamentally social practitioners and because neither social practices nor individual agents have priority over the other. There are no social practices without social practitioners and there are no social practitioners without social practices. Hegel’s response to this second dichotomy allows him to respond to the first one as well. The elaboration and specialization of natural needs and desires through exchange relations and 3

the social division of labor transfigures the contents of those needs and desires into collectively self-given ends. The social practices producing this transfiguration and meeting these ends form the contents of implicit principles of right. These implicit principles are collectively self-given because they result from the social practices collectively developed to meet these needs. Only acts that are executed and accepted by an agent are free acts. This strong condition requires that an agent’s intentions correspond to the actual nature and consequences of his or her act. Since the aims, the principles, and the means of action are fundamentally social, these strong constraints entail that free action is possible only within a community which makes known its structure and the role of its members within it and their contribution to it, so that its members can act on the basis of that knowledge. Hegel’s theory of the state is a theory of a communal structure that makes such explicit, free action possible. In briefest compass, Hegel holds that laws are legitimate only insofar as they codify those practices that have been developed in order to achieve human freedom, and laws are obligatory only insofar as they are necessary for achieving human freedom. Hegel’s government is designed to codify and promulgate such laws. Hegel’s legislature is designed to make known to the citizens at large, through their corporate representatives, that laws have such a basis and how individual roles and actions fit within the community as a whole. ‘Hegel on Political Representation: Laborers, Corporations, and the Monarch’. The Owl of Minerva 25.1 (1993):111–16. (Supplements previous item.) Hegel holds that members of a society can only be fully free and autonomous if they enjoy political representation. Hegel grants political representation to the landed aristocracy and to members of corporations. Causal day laborers fall outside both of these groups. Consequently, they lack political representation in Hegel’s state; hence they lack the political resources for full freedom and autonomy. This is a serious problem, but not so serious as Hegel’s marxist critics maintain. I propose two solutions based on Hegel’s institutional principles. First, day laborers typically work in the same industry, and often in the same factory. Once that regularity is established, such labor is no longer casual and it merits recognition through labor contracts and (ultimately) through corporate membership. Second, those workers who remain casual laborers deserve special attention from a government-sponsored agency which organizes and regularizes their training and job placement, and which represents their interests in Hegel’s Estates Assembly. I further suggest that Keynes’s public works strategy for moderating unemployment fits perfectly into Hegel’s institutional framework, and I show (contra Ilting) that Hegel’s exposition of the Crown is properly ordered. The Monarch is the organizational apex of Hegel’s government, but the Estates Assembly culminates Hegel’s program for achieving the political autonomy of individuals. ‘Community as the Basis of Free Individual Action’. Translation and annotation of excerpts from Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, in: M. Daly, ed., Communitarianism (Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth, 1994), 36–40. The passages translated here show that Hegel espoused ‘moderate collectivism’, a social ontology consisting in three theses: (1) Individuals are fundamentally social practitioners. Everything a person does, says, or thinks is formed in the context of social practices that provide material and conceptual resources, objects of desire, skills, procedures, techniques, and occasions and permissions for action, etc. (2) What individuals do depends on their own response to their social and natural environment. (3) There are no individuals, no social practitioners, without social practices, and vice versa, there are no social practices without social practitioners, without individuals who learn, participate in, perpetuate, and who modify those social practices as needed to meet their changing needs, aims, and circumstances (including information).

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‘Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Moral World View’. Philosophical Topics 19.2 (1991):133–76. Few if any of Kant’s critics were more trenchant than Hegel. Here I reconstruct some objections Hegel makes to Kant in a text that has received insufficient attention, the chapter titled ‘the Moral World View’ in the Phenomenology of Spirit. I show that Kant holds virtually all the tenets Hegel ascribes to ‘the moral world view’. I concentrate on five of Hegel’s main objections to Kant’s practical metaphysics. First, Kant’s problem of coordinating happiness with virtue (as worthiness to be happy) is contrived. Kant denies that there is any inherent connection between acting rightly and being happy, but his denial depends on his defining happiness in terms of satisfying inclinations, rather than in terms of achieving ends in general. Second, Kant’s view of moral motivation is contrived; he ultimately admits that we cannot resolve to act without taking inclinations into account. (We cannot resolve to act apart from the matter of our maxim.) Third, Kant’s idea about perfecting our virtue in an infinite progress is incoherent. Kant defines virtue, and evidence of virtue, in terms of overcoming inclinations. Inclinations die with the body. Therefore there can be neither virtue nor evidence of virtue after death. Fourth, Kant’s view of the autonomy of moral agency is inconsistent with viewing the moral law as a divine command. Fifth, Kant’s moral principles cannot be put into practice in concrete circumstances because he supplies inadequate guidance for classifying acts. I conclude that Hegel’s objections to Kant’s practical metaphysics are sound, and I show that the problems Hegel raised against Kant’s account of autonomy and moral motivation are still current, since they have not been resolved, e.g., by Onora O’Neill’s Constructions of Reason.

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